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The  study  analyses  the  determinants  of  investment  of  the  private  corporate  manufacturing 
sector in India in the context of financial liberalization. Though financial liberalization is still 
on the way, based on the theoretical argument of financial liberalization and its limitations in 
the context of asymmetric information and market imperfections, such an analysis assumes 
significance. Because, in imperfect financial markets with asymmetric information, external 
funds are more expensive than internal funds and firms have to follow a hierarchy in which 
cheaper funds are preferable to more expensive ones and internal funds are the most preferred 
ones. We tested the hypothesis that whether financial liberalization had an impact on firms’ 
investment decisions with respect to cash flow and debt. The study found that small firms are 
facing financial market imperfections in the form of liquidity constraints since it is seen that 
credit constraints were not eliminated or relaxed for these firms. Against this, one surprising 
result  is  the  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of  debt-to-capital  ratio  for  large  firms 
irrespective  of  the  financial  liberalisation  effect.  From  further  enquiry  we  found  that  the 
positive and significant impact of debt on investment for large firms has changed once we 
estimate  the  model  for  large  firms  according other  categories  based  on  group and  export 
orientation. It is seen that the positive and significant impact of debt does not hold for large 
non-group and non-exporting firms. On the other hand, the positive effect of debt remains the 
same  for  large  group  and  exporting  firms.  To  conclude,  market  imperfections  exist  in  the 
financial markets that prevent an economy wide efficiency in the post liberalisation period.  
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JEL Codes: D82, D92, G3, G38 
1 The context 
The broad objective of financial sector liberalisation in India in 1991 was to ensure 
that the market oriented financial sector contribute positively to economic growth by 
providing access to external funds
1 and by channelling investment towards growing 
profitable industries and firms. In the new milieu of financial reforms, market forces 
                                                          
1   A firm can mobilise resources mainly from two sources viz., internal and external. While internal 
sources  are  retained  earnings  and  depreciation,  external  sources  include  borrowings  (Banks  and 
Development Financial Institutions) and equity capital. 148
increasingly  govern  the  allocation  of  funds  and  this  has  implications  for  the 
availability, cost and quantum of funds, which ceteris paribus will enable the private 
corporate sector (hereafter corporate sector)
2 to make an optimum combination of 
sources of funds for industrial investment and its pace. Financial sector liberalization, 
it  was  expected,  will  alter  the  parameters  of  investment  functions  because  of  the 
relaxation  of  credit  constraints  and  influence  of  reduced  borrowing  costs  on 
investment decisions (Guncavdi et al. 1998).  
However, an analysis of financing pattern of Indian private corporate sector
3 reveals 
certain disturbing results. One of the most striking aspects of Indian private corporate 
financing is the increasing dependence of firms on internal funds after reforms rather 
than external funds. It is seen that a booming stock market has not witnessed any 
significant increase in money raised by firms from the capital market. Though there 
was boom in the new issues market in the initial years of reforms, the number of 
issues and amount raised by the corporate sector met with wide fluctuations in the 
later period of reforms. The number of issue of capital had gone up from 86 in 1992 
to  577  in  1995  and  then  registered  a  decline  to  22  in  2004.  Even  with  this  low 
performance,  the  average  BSE  Sensex  has  increased  tremendously.  The  Bombay 
Sensex rose from 3,727 on March 3, 2003 to 5,054 on July 22, 2004, and then on to 
6,017 on November 17, 2004, 7,077 on June 21, 2005, 8,272 on September 2, 2005 
and 10, 113 on February 15, 2006. The implied price increase of more than 100 per 
cent  over  a  19-month  period  and  33  per  cent  over  the  last  few  years  is  indeed 
remarkable. The increase in new capital issues raised grew only at a lower rate than 
the BSE Sensex (SEBI 2007). To conclude the jigsaw puzzle, even the regime of low 
interest rates and, more intriguingly, even in the phase of a booming stock market, 
firms  in  the  corporate  sector  have  a  clear  preference  for  retained  earnings  over 
external sources (borrowed funds in terms of debt and equity). This pattern supports 
the  pecking  order  theory
4  and  the  existence  of  information  asymmetry  even  after 
financial liberalization. Against this dismal performance, it is to be analysed that in 
spite of a substantial decline in interest rates and stock market liberalisation, why is 
the Indian corporate sector depending more on internal resources than on external 
resources from financial markets? Relying on recent theoretical studies on the link 
between financial market imperfections and real activity, we will examine whether 
the deregulation of the  financial sector has resulted in any relaxation of  financial 
constraints that firms face in their investment behaviour.  
                                                          
2   In this study, the corporate sector is defined as non-financial, non-government join stock companies. 
The corporate sector consists of closely held (private limited) and publicly held (public limited) 
companies, with approximately 6.19 lakh registered companies as of June 2003, about slightly less 
than half of them are engaged in manufacturing. As a percentage of GDP, the estimated paid-up 
capital of the non-government companies constitute 12.1 per cent (Government of India 2003)  
3   We have made use of data on sources of finance obtained from ‘Hand Book of Statistics on the 
Indian Securities Market’ provided by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI, 2007). 
4   The reason for questioning the role of financial liberalization in the recent empirical 
literature  is  due  to  the  emergence  of ‘financing  hierarchy  hypothesis’or  ‘pecking 
order hypothesis’. The hypothesis says that firms prefer internal funds to external 
funds because external funds are more expensive. 149
2 Financing patterns and investment: the theory 
According to the neoclassical theory of firm investment, since financial markets are 
perfect, there is neither transaction nor information costs, internal and external funds 
are perfect substitutes in terms of financing investment, and, firms have access to 
unlimited  sources  of  funds.  In  other  words,  financial  structure  of  firms  does  not 
matter in investment decisions and firm investment should not be constrained by any 
lack of funds (Modigliani and Miller 1958). However, M-M theorem fails to explain 
the firm’s investment decisions, if there is asymmetric information in the market. 
Financial markets, especially those of developing countries are imperfect in nature in 
the sense that the suppliers of funds have less information about the profitability and 
risks of investment projects than firms have.
5.
The financial structure of firms affects investment when there exists a wedge between 
the costs of external and internal finance in an imperfect financial market. First, market 
participants have different access to information. Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate 
that the cost of external funds is higher than that of internal funds owing to information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Second, managerial agency problems arise 
when managers who are not owners pursue their own interests (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). The firm is required to pay a premium for external financing if outside investors 
suspect the managers who are not owners pursue the interests of shareholders.  Finally, 
transaction costs associated with the issuance of debt and equity might raise the cost of 
external financing. Under such financial constraints, investment decisions depend on the 
availability  of  internal  funds.  Furthermore,  the  heterogeneity  of  firms  implies  that 
investment  of  financially  constrained  firms’  is  more  likely  to  be  affected  by  the 
availability of internal funds. With credit market imperfections, borrower’s investment 
decisions will be “excessively sensitive” to current cash flow. The external finance 
premium  and  credit  rationing  and  other  imperfections  suggest  that  investment  is 
sensitive to its internal funds. 
Accordingly, the financial structure (debt-equity structure) of a firm will influence its 
investment  decision  and  shocks  to  the  balance  sheet  will  alter  the  evolution  of 
investment over time. If the financial markets are segmented as in the case of most 
developing countries, the access of financial resources may differ for firms according 
to their market status, group, age, size etc. There will be a situation where some group 
of firms will be more dependent on internally generated funds for investment. These 
firms may sometimes have to forgo some investment levels due to extreme financial 
constraints in the financial system. In this type of situation, we expect the investment 
to be positively associated with cash flow or retained earnings of the firm.  
The empirical works generally adopted a framework to identify an a priori proxy for 
the  degree  of  financial  constraints  and  then  used  this  proxy  to  sort  the  firms  in 
question in to categories of different degrees of financial constraints. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) pointed out that there are differences in access to external finance by firms 
                                                          
5   The need for perfect information arises from the fact that in firm financing, though the firms receive 
finance today returns will be provided to suppliers of capital only in the future. 150
according to relative maturity. They found that less matured firms have inferior accesses 
to external finance. They also concluded that cash flow, as a measure of liquidity is an 
important determinant of investment. Utilising the dividend-payout ratio as a measure of 
financial constraint faced by firms, they had demonstrated that investments of financially 
constrained firms respond more sensitively to changes in cash flow. Since then, it has 
become  a  basic  research  methodology  to  examine  the  difference  in  sensitiveness  of 
investment to cash flow between a priori segmented firms. Fazzari et al. (2000) also 
strongly believe that the a priori firm classification approach is feasible to be used 
in  investigating  financial  constraints  facing  firms.  Existing  empirical  studies  have 
used  various  segmenting  variables  to  identify  unobservable  financial  constraints,  for 
example, group affiliation in Hoshi et al. (1991), firm size in Devereux and Schiantarelli 
(1989), issuing commercial paper and bond ratings and exchange listing in Oliner et al. 
(1992). A large number of studies considered the investment behaviour between firms 
having different age structure. Regarding age, it is generally opined that banks should 
have  better  information  about  older  and  more  matured  firms  due  to  longer 
relationships  and  repeated  contracts.  Having  explained  the  theoretical  views  we 
empirically estimate investment equations for various groups of firms in the Indian 
private  Corporate  Manufacturing  Sector  to  analyse  whether  credit  constraints  has 
reduced after financial liberalisation. 
3 Empirical model, data and construction of variables 
3.1 The model 
We  carried  out  our  empirical  analysis  by  estimating  an  unrestricted  investment 
equation of the lagged augmented accelerator model. An advantage of the augmented 
accelerator model
6 is that it consists of variables that are observable. The output term 
(∆Yi,t/Ki,  t-1) forms the basic variable in the model. The general specification for our 
regression Equation is: 
Iit/Ki t-1 = ￿ +β1 (It t-1/Kt t-2) + β2 (∆Yit/Ki t-1) + β3 (Sit/Ki t-1) + β4 (Dit/K t-1) + uit 
where, I = Investment; K= Capital Stock; Y = Output; S = Cash Flow; D = Stock of  
outstanding debt; β1, β2, β3 andβ4 are parameters and uit  is the disturbance term. 
uit = εit + λi in which λi is the firm specific fixed effect, and  εit is a random error term. 
                                                          
6   Although this model is fairly standard in the investment literature, it is subject to criticism. It is 
argued that the simultaneous inclusion of cashflow and debt may reduce their explanatory powers. 
For  instance,  if  firms  with  higher  cash  flows  are  more  profitable,  their  investment  would  be 
positively responsive to cash flows, even though they encounter no financial constraints. Despite 
these criticisms, a number of empirical studies have used the level of cash flows as a proxy for the 
change in net worth (from internal funds) because cash flows are virtually the only measure available 
for many firms. In fact, the augmented accelerator model is among the most successful empirical 
ones in the sense that it better explains the behaviour of firm investment (Fazzari et al,1988). 151
3.2 Data and variables used for the study 
The data used is the centre for Monitoring Indian Economy’s (CMIE) manufacturing 
firm  level  data  available  from  the  electronic  database  PROWESS.  The  sample 
consists of 19852 observations on 2269 firms. The period of analysis is 1993/94 to 
2003/2004. The variables used for study are as follows. 
Change in Output (∆Yit/Ki t-1): The inclusion of change in output will enable us to 
capture the expected change in demand for the firm’s product. This forms the basis of 
accelerator theory. We take the ratio of value of change in output to capital stock (∆Y
i,t/Ki,  t-1) as a measure of output since there  may  be  lags  either  in  the  investment 
decisions and/or in the implementation of these decisions. 
Lagged  value  of  Investment  (INV  (-1)):  Regarding  the  effects  on  investment  we 
included the lagged value of investment-to-capital ratio (It t-1/Kt t-2). This is because 
the  importance  of  the  previous  investment  level  may  some  times  determine  the 
present investment decision of firms.  
Cash Flow (CASHFLOW): We use the ratio of gross cash flow before interest and a 
tax to capital (St/Kt-1, gross operating surplus) to capture the liquidity position of the 
firm. Specifically, the positive and significant coefficient of cash flow is indicative of 
no finance constraint.  
Debt  to  Capital  Ratio  (DEBT):  Another  regressor  used  is  Debt  to  Capital  ratio 
(leverage ratio) (Dt/Kt-1). We have taken debt as the sum of both short-term (banks) 
and  long-term  (development  financial  institutions)  borrowings  of  firms.  A  better 
functioning of financial system  would imply investment is less determined by the 
firm’s  internal  resources  and  less  negatively  affected  by  leverage,  which,  in  turn, 
would  imply  significant  and  non-negative  magnitude  on  the  coefficient  DEBT 
(Fazzari et al. 1988). 
Financial  Liberalization  Index  (FLIN):    Financial  Liberalisation  Index  through 
dummies as we assigned, takes value zero, one, two or three, depending on whether 
the financial sector is fully repressed, partially repressed, largely liberalized or fully 
liberalized along each of the dimensions of financial sector liberalisation in each year. 
These  dimensions  include  (a)  interest  rate  liberalisation,  (b)  reduction  in  reserve 
requirements, (c) money market reforms, (d) pro-competition measures, (e) capital 
market reforms, (f) legal reforms, (g) international financial liberalisation etc. The 
basic methodology followed for this purpose is from Bandiera et al. (2000) and Abiad 
and Modi (2003). We have used the method of principal component analysis (PCA) 
to  reduce  a  large  set  of  variables  to  a  small  set  that  still  contains  most  of  the 
information in the large set.
7  
The summary measures of variables used in the model are given in Table 1. 
                                                          
7   The Dummies assigned, principal components and trends in financial liberalisation index etc can be 
obtained from the author on request. 152
Table 1.  
Summary Measures of Variables 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
I/K  0.201  0.252 
Y/K  0.312  0.395 
S/K  0.243  2.246 
D/K  0.375  0.2986 
Number of firms  2269 
Number of observations  19910 
Source: Date Collected from Prowess Database, CMIE 
4 Estimation and results 
4.1 Issues in estimation 
In the case of panel data, the estimation of the model using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS)  may  yield  unsatisfactory  results,  because  dynamic  investment  models  are 
likely to suffer from endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem arises mainly 
due to two reasons. First, in a dynamic investment model, there is the presence of 
lagged  dependent  variable.  The  presence  of  lagged  dependent  variable  makes  the 
estimates inconsistent. Second, there is the problem of correlation of error term with 
output and cash flow. Suppose there is a technology shock in terms of increase in 
productivity, then investment will increase and as a result output and cash flow will 
be higher. Since the error term captures a technology shock to the profit function, it 
may be correlated with explanatory variables such as output and cash flow. In order to 
overcome these problems, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation is 
widely used for dynamic panel data models. 
The  investment  equations  in  our  empirical  analysis  have  been  estimated  in  first 
differences to eliminate the fixed effects in the model. This will help us to control for 
the firm specific effects. We have used the Generalised method of Moments to allow 
for the potential endogeneity of the independent variables. The appropriate lagged 
values of the right hand side variables are used as instruments. We have used full 
instruments of second lag onwards in the models estimated. The consistency of the 
GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values of the micro variables are 
valid instruments in the regression procedure. A necessary condition for the validity 
of such instruments is that the error term be serially uncorrelated. If the model has 
been  transformed  to  first  difference  as  we  do  in  our  estimation,  first  order  serial 
correlations are to be expected but not second order. In the absence of higher-order 153
serial  correlation,  the  GMM  estimator  provides  consistent  estimates  of  the 
parameters.  
To address these issues, we present two specification tests suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests 
for  the  overall  validity  of  the  instruments  by  analyzing  the  sample  analog  of  the 
moment  conditions  used  in  the  estimation  process.  The  second  test  examines  the 
hypothesis that the error term differentiated regression is not-second order serially 
correlated, which implies that the error term in the level regression is not serially 
correlated. The failure to reject the null hypotheses in all cases provides support to 
model estimation. From the Regression, we report m1 test of the existence of first-
order serial correlation, m2 test of the second order serial correlation, and a robust 
Sargan test of the over identifying restrictions that the estimator exploits. For the 
estimation of our unbalanced panel data on Indian private corporate manufacturing 
firms we have used the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) technique
8. The estimation is 
carried out using the OX Package.  
4.2 Results and discussion 
In our empirical analysis, our central question is that, what are the variables that are 
most  likely  to  determine  a  firm’s  decision  to  invest?  In  order  to  carry  out  the 
empirical investigation we have to capture the importance of market segmentation. 
We  try  to  estimate  investment  levels  as  determined  by  cash  flow  (expected 
profitability)  and  debt-to-capital  ratio  (the  degree  of  financial  leverage).  The 
theoretical  considerations  suggest  that,  while  profitability  should  have  a  positive 
effect,  degree  of  financial  leverage  should  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  level  of 
investment under market imperfections due to asymmetric information. In a perfect 
financial market world, since the costs of internal and external funds are the same and 
the firm is supposed to have access to an unlimited amount of external funds, the 
investment of the firm is not sensitive to internal funds. If the financial market is 
imperfect, the additional cost of external funds increases at an ever-increasing rate. 
Therefore, an increase (decrease) in internal funds will lower (raise) the cost of funds 
that  the  firm  uses  to  invest,  thereby  increasing  (decreasing)  its  investment.  This 
means that investment of the firm is positively correlated with its internal funds. More 
over, if the measure of cash flow has a positive impact on investment; it means the 
existence  of  constrained  access  to  credit  markets.  Because  in  the  absence  of 
constrained access to resources, firms would borrow as much as needed to maximise 
profits, and cash flow would not be constraining. 
The results of the model 1 and model 2 estimated by assuming the condition that the 
slope  coefficients  are  same  for  all  firms  are  given  in  Table  2.  We  start  with  the 
coefficient of lagged investment in the model. The coefficient on lagged investment 
(INV  (-1))  had  shown  a  positive  and  highly  significant  coefficient  means  that 
investment rates show inertia. That is, overtime, they are serially correlated even after 
                                                          
8   The program DPD (Dynamic panel data) has been used in the estimation. See Arellano and Bond 
(1988, 1991) for specification of Dynamic Panel data. 154
controlling for all relevant variables. This implies that the effects of a change in a given 
investment decision will fully realise only after a number of years. Thus for the entire 
period considered, we observe a significant dynamic component represented by the lag 
of the investment to capital ratio. As in the case of lagged investment, the estimated 
coefficient for the output is also positive and significant. In other words, an increase in 
output leads to an increase investment. It indicates a determining role of accelerator 
(demand) and investment opportunities in determining investment. 
Table 2.  
Estimation Results of Financial Liberalisation and Investment–All Firms 
All Firms 
Dependent Variable (It/Kt-1) 
Model 1  Model 2 
Constant  -0.146* (-5.53)  -0.056* (-4.32) 
INV (-1)  0.002** (2.03)  0.005** (1.89) 
OUTPUT  0.019** (2.82)  0.036* (3.99) 
CASH FLOW  0.062* (3.25)  0.105** (2.49) 
DEBT   0.171** (2.32)  0.235* (4.91) 
FLIN*CASH FLOW  -  -0.332** (2.08) 
FLIN*DEBT  -  0.403* (4.99) 
m1  -2.306 [0.000]  -2.167 [0.000] 
m2  -1.096 [0.173]  -0.1280 [0.230] 
Sargan Test  139.2 [0.538]  207.6 [0.469] 
Number of Firms  2269 
Observations  19852 
Note: * and ** shows significance levels at 1 percent, and 5 percent 
Given in Parentheses are t - statistics except for m1, m2 and Sargan test. 
m1 is the test for first order serial correlation 
m2 is the test for second order serial correlation 
Sargan test gives the over identifying restrictions X
2 (p) 
It  is  seen  from  model  1  that  the  coefficient  of  cash  flow  is  positive  and  highly 
significant. The positive and significant coefficient of the cash flow (0.062) variable 
indicates that cash flow strongly affect investment. This result is consistent with the 
existence of a financing hierarchy. Cash flow provides the only source of finance for 
those firms that are liquidity constrained, and for those firms that do have access to 
external market, cash flow provides a relatively cheaper form of finance (Mills et al. 
1994).  It  is  also  seen  that  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  on  the  debt  to  capital  ratio 
(leverage) is positive (0.171) and significant at 5 per cent level, which means that 
accumulation of debt does not hinder outside financing. This goes against the basic 
theoretical  understanding  of  its  negative  association  with  investment  based  on 
agency-cost arguments in the presence of asymmetric information. Because it is often 
pointed out that, higher levels of debt result in an increased probability of financial 
distress and the demand for higher returns by potential suppliers of funds. If external 
financing costs increase  with the degree of leverage, the  leverage ratio should be 155
negatively associated with investment. But the result of debt ratio in our model for all 
firms does not support the argument that it will impede investment
9.  
4.2.1 Financial liberalisation and credit constraints 
Up  to  this,  we  were  discussing  the  investment  behaviour  for  the  entire  period 
considered  for  the  study.  Now  our  question  is,  does  this  behaviour  changes  with 
financial deregulation? To investigate this, we now analyse how firms’ behaviour has 
been affected by the deregulation in financial markets. The main emphasis of the 
study  is  on  the  response  to  liberalisation  in  financial  markets  and  hence  of  the 
coefficients of cash flow and debt variables. To test whether financial liberalization 
has affected the financing constraints of firms, the variables cash flow and debt are 
interacted with financial liberalization index (FLIN).  
In model 2, estimates of the interaction terms (CASHFLOW*FLIN and DEBT*FLIN) 
for all firms are given. We estimate the coefficients of cash flow and debt ratio to 
analyse how the financing behaviour of sample firms have changed with financial 
liberalisation.  From  model  2,  it  is  seen  that  when  we  interact  with  FLIN,  the 
coefficient of cash flow has come down and became negative and significant (-0.332) 
showing less importance for internal resources in financing investment. This means 
that financial liberalisation has led to a significant reduction in financing constraints. 
In  the  case  of  debt  ratio,  the  coefficient  of  debt  has  increased  with  financial 
liberalization  indicating  a  larger  role  for  debt  in  financing  investment  after 
liberalisation  of  financial  markets.  This  suggests  that  with  financial  liberalisation 
credit  constraints  has  reduced.  The  overall  conclusion  is  that  the  measures  of 
deregulation  in  financial  markets  have  had  its  impact  of  mitigating  resource 
constraints in terms of external finance for investment. However, the positive and 
significant debt ratio even after liberalization for all firms tends us to make further 
analysis in the light of our theory suggesting a negative association between debt and 
investment  under  financial  market  imperfections.  In  other  words,  we  now  turn  to 
estimate investment functions to examine whether credit constraints has reduced for 
all types of firms as a result of financial liberalization.  
4.2.2 Impact across size categories 
To cast light on the source of the positive sign of debt on investment for all firms, we 
try  to  experiment  the  estimation  for  different  size  categories  of  firms.  For  the 
analytical purpose we use size as a base to identify firms that should be more likely to 
face information-based liquidity constraints in resource mobilization.  
                                                          
9   Harris et al. (1994) find a negative association between investment and the debt-to-capital ratio for 
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Table 3.  
Estimation Results for Liberalisation on Investment- Size groups 




Constant  -0.295**  (-2.92)  -0.509*  (-3.86) 
INV (-1)  0.038**  (2.19)  0.008** (2.52) 
OUTPUT  0.012**  (1.95)  0.114** (2.05) 
CASH FLOW  0.166 ** (2.98)  0.072    (1.58) 
DEBT  0.139*   (3.28)  0.214** (2.88) 
CASH FLOW*FLIN  0.237**  (2.36)  - 
DEBT *FLIN  -0.019** (2.12)  - 
CASH FLOW*FLIN    0.108** (2.29) 
Debt*FLIN    0.389** (1.99) 
m1  -0.113  [0.000]  -0.365  [0.000] 
m2  -2.125  [0.169]  -2.824  [0.156] 
Sargan Test  63.45  [0.188]  115.74  [0.298] 
Number of firms  819  1450 
Note: * and ** shows significance levels at 1 per cent, and 5 per cent 
           Given in Parentheses are t - statistics except for m1, m2 and Sargan test. 
           m1 is the test for first order serial correlation 
           m2 is the test for second order serial correlation 
           Sargan test gives the over identifying restrictions X
2 (p) 
In models 3 and 4 of Table 3 we differentiate between small and large firms respectively to 
analyse whether investment behaviour and finance constraints differ across different firm 
sizes. We have considered firms having value of gross fixed assets below 50 million Rs as 
small firms and firms having value of gross fixed assets above 50 million Rs following 
Government of India (2003).  We specifically examine the effect of cash flow and debt 
variables on investment with financial liberalization for small and large firms. 
The  picture  obtained  from  model  3  seems  very  interesting.  We  find  that  financial 
liberalization has not reduced or relaxed the dependence of small firms on internal funds. 
The  estimated  coefficient of  cash  flow  on  investment  has  increased  from  0.186 before 
financial  liberalization  to  0.237  when  we  interact  with  financial  liberalization  index. 
Evidence  also  suggests  that,  with  financial  liberalisation,  investment  remains  to  be 
negatively affected by the debt-to-capital ratio (-0.019) at 5 per cent level significance. These 
results support the hypothesis that they were dependent on internal funds to finance their 
investment even after financial reforms.  They also faced an increasing cost of external funds 
as their leverage increased, as suggested by the negative and significant sign of the leverage 
coefficient. This suggests that small firms are still credit constrained and liberalisation has 
not made any significant improvement in smaller firms’ access to external finance.  
Now if we consider large firms’ investment behaviour in model 4, it is noted that changes in 
financial markets does not seem to have similar effects on large firms’ financing behaviour. 
For  large  firms  internal  funds  or  profit  was  less  important  in  augmenting  investment. 
However, the positive coefficient of cash flow which was relatively small and insignificant 
for  large  firms  (0.072)  before  liberalisation  has  increased  (0.108)  and  became  highly 157
statistically significant when we interact with financial liberalization index.
10 On the other 
hand, the debt-to capital ratio coefficient is significantly positive for large firms even after 
considering the effect of financial liberalisation. The result seems to suggest that for larger 
firms, having a higher degree of leverage increase their capability to mobilize external funds. 
In other words, unlike small firms, large firms were not credit constrained irrespective of 
financial liberalisation policies
11. One possible explanation for this is that, having obtained 
debt  in  the  past  may  act  as  a  signal  to  financial  intermediaries  like  banks  and  other 
institutions about the firm’s credit worthiness. From the estimated coefficients of cash flow 
and debt ratio, it can be concluded that while cash flow exerts a positive influence, debt is 
negatively affecting investment of small firms. On the other hand, for large firms debt shows 
positive and significant coefficient. To summarise, the results lend credence to the fact that 
the financial liberalization reduced financing constraints mainly confining to large firms. 
4.2.3 Testing for other attributes – group and export orientation  
The above result of positive and significant coefficient of debt for large firms in both periods 
poses a question for further enquiry. The question is that, what are the factors that can 
explain this result? We may have to think that, there are attributes other than firm’s size that 
affects the investment behaviour. We would hypothesis that being in a group (business 
house) or in export oriented firms help firms to have better access to various sources of 
external finance.
12 Our attempt is to shed light on the question, why the coefficient on the 
degree of leverage is positive for large firms? For this in Table 4, we allow the debt (degree 
of leverage) to differ between larger firms that belong to a business house (group) and those 
which do not belong to a business house (non business house or non- group) in model 5. We 
also made estimation by allowing the coefficient of the degree of leverage of the larger firms 
to  differ  between  those  who  are  exporting  and  domestic  market  oriented  firms  (non-
exporting) in model 6. The select coefficients on cash flow and debt are given in Table 4. 
In model 5 and 6 of Table 4, the behaviour of the cash flow remains the same as in 
the case of previous models.
13 But the debt variable for group and export firms gives 
                                                          
10   It will be worth mentioning in this context the study by Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989) on Italian 
firms. In their study they showed that large firms are more sensitive to cash flow than small firms. 
They argued that large firms have a lower relative cash flow, and the agency costs are higher due to 
the complex ownership structure. 
11   In the pre liberalisation period, large firms often tend to corner a significant chunk of the preferential 
credit by virtue of political economy considerations, which tends to disappear once liberalisation 
begins to take effect, when commercial considerations assumed importance. However, our analysis 
tends to suggest that even after financial liberalisation small firms continued to be credit constrained. 
12   It is generally argued that large firms are quite often belongs to group firms (business houses) or 
export-oriented firms. Thus the positive and significant relationship between debt and investment for 
large firms may be the impact of firms association with foreign markets. This association mainly 
comes from the export orientation. If firms are export oriented, they may be less sensitive to foreign 
exchange risk and therefore have a better position to borrow in the cheaper foreign markets. One 
plausible explanation is in the way a group’s head office assigns its borrowings to establishments that 
belong to the group or business houses.  (Harris et al. 1992). 
13   Since our primary interest is on debt coefficients we have not reported all the results including 
coefficients on cash flow. Cash flow coefficients for all the categories remain the same as similar for 
large firms in model 4, except small difference in magnitudes. 158
an  interesting  pattern.  Following  the  theoretical  links,  in  a  world  of  asymmetric 
information and agency cost, the leverage coefficient is expected to be negative.  
While large group and exporting firms shows a positive and significant debt ratio 
coefficient  in  both  pre  and  post  liberalisation  periods,  in  the  case  of  non-group 
(individual) and domestic oriented (non-exporting) firms, the coefficient on debt to 
capital ratio was significantly negative in both periods. What emerges from this is that 
the positive and significant relationship between the leverage and investment for large 
firms does not hold for non-group and non-exporting large firms. It is negative and 
significant for both individual firms and non-exporting firms indicating the presence 
of credit constraints for them. One may conclude that the positive and significant debt 
to capital coefficient for large firms is due to the advantages derived by them being a 
group or an exporting firm.
14 The only difference in result between large group and 
large exporting firms is in the magnitude of the coefficient and not the sign of the 
coefficient. The basic investment behaviour is that being an export firm or belonging 
to a group firm helps them to accrue the benefits of financial liberalization. 
Table 4.  




DEBT*Export  0.220** (1.83) 
DEBT*Export* FLIN  0.132** (2.34) 
DEBT*Non-Export  -0.169* -(3.55) 
DEBT*Non-Export, FLIN   -0.010** (0.220) 
m1  -0.868 [0.000] 
m2  -1.023 [0.451] 




DEBT*Group  0.158** (2.22) 
DEBT*Group*FLIN  0.196** (2.98) 
DEBT*Non-Group  -0.056* -(2.98) 
DEBT*Non-Group* FLIN  -0.006** -(1.82) 
m1  -0.145  [0.000] 
m2  -1.310  [0.756] 
Sargan Test  206.4  [0.452] 
Note: * and ** shows significance levels at 1 percent, and 5 per cent 
          T-statistics are given in parantheses 
          M1 is the test for first order serial correlation, n (0,1) 
          M2 is the test for second order serial correlation 
          Sargan test gives the overidentifying restrictions X
2  (p) 
                                                          
14   To put in another way, the positive and significant relationship between debt and investment for large 
firms may be the impact of firms association with foreign markets. This association mainly comes 
from  the  export  orientation.  If  firms  are  export  oriented,  they  may  be  less  sensitive  to  foreign 
exchange risk and therefore have a better position to borrow in the cheaper foreign markets. 159
5 Conclusion 
The theory implicitly assumes that asymmetric information and market imperfections 
in the credit and capital markets prevent the efficient mobilisation of resources, which 
hinder an economy wide efficiency. The econometric evidences in our study provide 
qualified support for these theories. At the aggregate level, the result suggests that 
with  financial  liberalisation  credit  constraints  have  reduced.  We  have  analysed 
whether this result is true for different size firms. It was found without doubt that 
small  firms  are  facing  financial  market  imperfections  in  the  form  of  liquidity 
constraints. This implies that financial liberalisation has not improved the access to 
external finance for small firms. However, one surprising result is the positive and 
significant  coefficient  of  debt-to  capital  ratio  for  large  firms  irrespective  of  the 
financial liberalization effect. This goes against the basic theoretical understanding of 
a negative association. It means that financial liberalisation has helped the large firms 
to access debt after financial liberalisation. From further enquiry we found that the 
positive and significant impact of debt on investment for large firms has changed 
once we estimate the model for large firms belongs to various categories. It is seen 
that the positive and significant impact of debt does not hold for large non-group and 
non-exporting firms. On the other hand, the positive effect of debt remains the same 
for large group and exporting firms. This implies that being in a group or having 
export orientation helped them to have access to credit markets. Thus it is concluded 
that the financial liberalisation reduced the financial constraints basically for large 
group  and  exporting  firms.  The  differences  in  the  results  on  the  determinants  of 
investment across different sized firms in the Indian context suggest that the impact of 
financial liberalisation on investment is influenced by the differences in the financial 
structure of firms. The study questions the efficacy of financial liberalization process 
by stating that market imperfections exists in the financial markets even after the 
reforms that prevent an economy wide efficiency. 
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